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NOTES
THE DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE IN MISSOURI
Under the English common law, if an owner of land in fee
tried to convey a life estate or an estate tail to another, and limit
the remainder to the grantor's heirs, the remainder to the grant-
or's heirs was void, and a reversion was left in the grantor;
consequently, if the heirs took any interest in the land at all, they
took the reversion by descent from the grantor on his death, and
not a remainder by purchase under the conveyance.' The rule
was established as a rule of property in England in the late six-
teenth century2 and remained until abolished by statute in 1833.3
In this country the rule has survived, but for the most part it
no longer has the force of a rule of property, as was its original
effect, but rather it operates as a rule of construction.4
The reasons now accepted for the rule are largely historical.
Perhaps the original basis for the rule can best be explained as
an attempt on the part of the courts to preserve the feudal inci-
dents of relief, wardship, and marriage in favor of the overlord.
These incidents redounded to the overlord only when the heirs
took the land by descent and not when the heirs took by pur-
chase. As a result, unless the limitation in the conveyance to the
heirs was considered void, so that the heirs could not take by
purchase, but had to take, if at all, by descent, the overlord would
have lost these valuable incidents. Other reasons given were
that title acquired by descent is a "worthier" title than that ac-
quired by purchase; that the heir is part of the ancestor and
therefore a conveyance to the heir is a conveyance to the ances-
tor, i.e., a conveyance to one's self, which was impossible; and
that the creditors of the ancestor could not reach the land in the
hands of the heirs if they took by purchase, but could if they took
by descent.5 These reasons, some of them unconvincing even in
1. 1 SImEs, LAW OF FUTUP INTERESTS 259 (1st ed. 1936).
2. Bingham's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 91a, 76 Eng. Rep. 611 (1598-1600); Earl
of Bedford's Case, Moo. K.B. 718, 72 Eng. Rep. 861 (1592-1593).
3. 3 & 4 WiLL. IV, c. 106.
4. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §314 (1940); 1 SIMEs, LAW OF FUTURE IN-
TERSTS 265 (1st ed. 1936); 16 A.L.R.2d 691 (1951).
5. See 1 SIMEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 261 (1st ed. 1936); RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY §314 (1940); 1 PAGE, WniLs 435 (lifetime ed. 1941).
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the early stages of the common law, certainly find no support
under the modern law, and as a result, the rule has been con-
stantly adversely criticized., Perhaps the only valid reason for
the continuance of the doctrine today is that given by the Re-
statement of Property. The rule, according to this authority, is
based on the reason that ". . the average conveyor does not
intend by a limitation to his own heirs to create in them an
interest which is indestructible by him during his own lifetime.",
In view of the modern emphasis on the intention of the grantor
as the polestar of construction of a conveyance, this reason seems
to be a valid one in support of the rule.
The doctrine under consideration has at least a superficial
similarity to the rule in Shelley's Case in that under the applica-
tion of both rules a limitation to "heirs" is found to be void.
Hence for the purpose of clarity these two rules should be dis-
tinguished. The rule in Shelley's Case applies to the situation in
which the grantor conveys to A and then to the heirs of A,8
whereas the rule here considered applies to a conveyance by the
grantor to A and then to the heirs of the grantor.0 Although the
rule in Shelley's Case has been abolished by statute in many
states,10 including Missouri," there has been very little statutory
treatment of the doctrine of worthier title. 12
The best statement of the rule is found in the Restatement of
Property as follows:
When a person makes an otherwise effective intervivos
conveyance of an interest in land to his heirs, or of an
interest in things other than land, to his next of kin, then,
unless a contrary intent is found from additional language
or circumstances, such conveyance to his heirs or next of
kin is a nullity in the sense that it designates neither a con-
veyee nor the type of interest conveyed. 13
This rule has had general application in this country, either as
a rule of property or as a rule of construction. Although the
6. See Harper and Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier Title, 24 ILl. L.
REV. 627 (1930); Comment, 5 Mo. L. REv. 232 (1940).
7. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §314, comment e (1940).
8. 1 Sm~s, LAW oF FUTURE INTERESTS 196 (1st ed. 1936).
9. Id. at 259.
10. Id. at 244.
11. MO. REv. STAT. §§442.490, 468.320 (1949).
12. Morris, The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 2
OKLA. L. REV. 133, 170 (1949).
13. RESTATEMFNT, PROPERTY §314 (1940).
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rule was originally applied in England as a rule of property, the
general tendency in this country has been to apply the rule as
one of construction. That is, where there is a conveyance in
which an interest in land is limited to the heirs of the grantor,
or an interest in personalty is limited to the next of kin of the
grantor, there arises a presumption that the grantor retains a
reversion and that the heirs or the next of kin take nothing. "
The doctrine of worthier title is properly applicable only when
the language of the conveyance attempts to create a remainder
in the proper heirs or next of kin of the grantor, i.e., those who
would take the property from the grantor by intestate succes-
sion, if the grantor had died intestate. Consequently, there arises
a problem of construing the instrument which purports to limit
an interest to the heirs or next of kin of the grantor, a problem
which must be answered before it can be determined whether
the doctrine of worthier title is to be applied to avoid the limi-
tation. The answer to the problem is to be found in the inten-
tion of the grantor; that is, it must be determined whether the
grantor intended to limit an interest to his "heirs" or "next of
kin" as these words are used in their primary sense. Normally,
of course, the words describing the persons to whom the interest
is limited should be given their usual meaning, but where a clear
indication that another meaning was intended arises from other
language of the conveyance or surrounding circumstances, that
meaning should be given to the words. There are two such
possibilities. The grantor, in limiting an interest to his "heirs"
or "next of kin" could have intended to refer to persons other
than those who would take from him by intestate succession, in
which case the doctrine is not properly applicable. On the other
hand, the grantor may have used words other than "heirs" or
"next of kin" and yet have intended those people who would have
taken by intestate succession, in which case the doctrine is
properly applicable.15
If it is found that the grantor intended to limit an interest to
14. Morris, supra note 12, at 143. Of course, even if there were a valid
contingent remainder in the heirs or next of kin of the grantor, the grantor
would retain a reversion. This reversion, however, would be subject to com-
plete defeasance in the event the particular estate terminated before the
death of the grantor. The effect of the application of the worthier titledoctrine is to make this reversion indefeasible. SImEs, HANDBoox ON THE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 88 (1st ed. 1951).
15. Id. at 90 (1951) ; Morris, supra note 12, at 149.
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his heirs or next of kin, as these terms are used in their primary
sense, the doctrine of worthier title is applied to avoid these
interests with the end result that the grantor retains a reversion
unless a contrary intent is shown. Some indication of the major
factors seized upon by the courts to find a contrary intent is
given in a later section of this note. It is sufficient to say at this
point that the intent which must be shown by those claiming that
the doctrine should not be applied to the conveyance under con-
sideration is the intent that the grantor should not during his
lifetime have the power of disposition of the remaining interest.10
Although the early reasons for the rule had import only as
applied to realty, a fact which resulted in the limitation of the
rule to transfers involving real property by the English courts,
the American courts have quite generally applied the rule to
transfers of personal property also.' 7 In view of the fact that
the reason now accepted as the basis for the rule is as equally
applicable to transfers of personalty as to those of realty, this
extension seems sound. It should be noted, however, that where-
as the proper designation of the parties who will take from the
grantor by descent is "heirs" if the property is realty, the
proper designation is "next of kin" if the property is personalty.
Consequently, when the subject matter of the conveyance is
personalty, in the initial problem of construction just con-
sidered the courts should find that the grantor intended "next
of kin" by the language used in the conveyance. However, quite
often the word "heirs" is used even though the conveyance is of
personalty. Little difficulty is encountered in this respect, and
the courts appear willing to construe "next of kin" to mean
heirs and "heirs" to mean next of kin, depending upon the nature
of the subject matter of the conveyance. This liberality is quite
probably due to the fact that under modern statutes of descent
and distribution one's heirs and next of kin are the same group
of people.'
The Supreme Court of Missouri in a recent opinion concern-
ing this question 9 adopted the Restatement form of the rule
16. RESTATEMENT, PRoPERTY §314, comment e (1940).
17. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §314, comment a (1940); SIMES, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 85 (1st ed. 1951); 16 A.L.R.2d 691, 701,(1951).
18. Morris, supra note 12, at 142.
19. Davidson v. Todd, 350 Mo. 639, 167 S.W.2d 641 (1943).
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and applied it to the facts before them. The grantor conveyed to
A and the heirs of his body; the conveyance also contained the
following provision, "... said premises to revert to the grantor
herein or become part of his estate.. .," in the event that A die
without heirs of his body. There was a further provision in the
conveyance that the land should not be liable for the debts of A.
The grantor died intestate leaving A as his only heir, and A then
died intestate and without heirs of his body. The dispute arose
between the collateral heirs of the grantor and the heir of A
(his wife) as to who owned the land. A Missouri statute, which
was applied in this case, converts what would be by the common
law an estate tail into a life estate in the first taker and a con-
tingent remainder in the heirs of the body of the first taker.20
The collateral heirs of the grantor, relying on the case of Norman
v. Horton21 (discussed infra), argued that the deed created con-
tingent class remainders in the alternative-first, in the bodily
heirs of the life tenant, and second, in default thereof, in the
collateral heirs of the grantor-and that, therefore, until the
death of the life tenant, the fee was in abeyance. Consequently,
it could not pass by intestate succession to the life tenant, but
rather became vested in the collateral heirs of the grantor on
the event of and at the time of the life tenant's death without
issue. The Missouri Supreme Court, however, rejecting this
argument and approving the rule and reasoning as set forth in
the Restatement, held that under the conveyance the grantor
retained a reversion, which passed by intestate succession to the
life tenant on the death of the grantor and on the death of the
life tenant to the life tenant's heirs, in this case, his wife. The
court agreed with the Restatement that the rule was one of con-
struction to be applied unless there was manifested in the in-
strument or in other circumstances a contrary intent, and that
the contrary intent, which if found would prevent the operation
of the rule, is the intent that the grantor could not destroy the
interest of the heirs during his (the grantor's) natural life. The
court found no contrary intent from the facts in this case, but,
on the contrary, found an affirmative manifestation of intent
that the grantor should have control over the reversion during
his life in the expression that the land should "revert" to the
20. Mo. Rsv. STAT. §442.470 (1949).
21. 344 Mo. 290, 126 S.W.2d 187 (1939).
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grantor or his estate (since this provision spelled out the possi-
bility that the land might revert to the grantor himself), and
from a clause in the deed which at least purported to keep the
land free from the grantee's debts (since this showed an intent
to preserve the remainderman's and the reversioner's interests).
The decision and reasoning in this case eliminated some con-
fusion which existed in the previous Missouri cases and either
impliedly overruled some of these cases or completely dis-
regarded the reasoning therein. In Chist V. Kuehne,22 the
grantor conveyed to his wife by a deed containing the following
habendum: "To have and to hold ... from and after death of
said party of the first part [grantor], for and during her
natural life, and after her death to have and to hold to heirs.
at law of the said party of the first part and their heirs and
assigns forever.. .", it being expressly stated that the grantor
should retain the possession and control of the premises during
his lifetime. Subsequently, the grantor and his wife joined in a
conveyance of the same land to a straw party, who in turn con-
veyed it back to them as joint tenants. The grantor died, leaving
as heirs some children by a former marriage, and then the wife
died, leaving as heirs her mother and two brothers. Ejectment
was brought by the wife's heirs against the lessees of the grant-
or's heirs and the court held for the defendants. After holding
that the writing in question was not testamentary and conse-
quently not revoked by the subsequent conveyance, the court,
not citing any authority or even considering the question here
under discussion, found that the writing created a remainder
in fee in the heirs of the grantor which could not be destroyed
by the subsequent action of the grantor in joining with his wife
and conveying to another. The court said that after delivery of
the deed to the wife, the grantor's interest, the interest of his
wife and that of his heirs
. . . became fixed and absolute; and the grantor could do
nothing while enjoying the possession of said premises
under the reservation therein to himself to revoke or to im-
pair the estate thus created, even though the wife shouldjoin him in the subsequent conveyance of said prop-
erty... 23
22. 172 Mo. 118, 72 S.W. 537 (1903).
23. Id. at 128, 72 S.W. at 539.
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In Rayl v. Golfinopulos24 the conveyance was by a husband to
a trustee to hold the property for the benefit of the grantor's
wife during her life, the wife having power to direct the sale of
the land at any time, and on her death the property, if not sold,
was to "revert" to the grantor if the grantor survived the wife,
and if he did not, then the property was to "revert" to the
grantor's heirs at law. The court, again not referring to the
particular doctrine here in question, and not mentioning the
Kuehne case, held that the fee passed to the trustee, that an
equitable life estate was created in the wife with power of
appointment superadded, that there was a contingent remainder
in the grantor to become vested if his wife predeceased him, and
that there was a contingent remainder in the heirs of the grantor
to become vested in the event of the grantor's death before the
wife. The only authority cited to support this construction was
a case involving estates identical to the above except that the
remainder was limited to someone other than the grantor or his
heirs.
In Norman v. Horton,2- the grantor conveyed to A (his daugh-
ter) for life and on her death then to the heirs of her body, and
if she died without heirs of her body, ".... then the title to...
the real estate, at her death, shall revert to and vest absolutely
in the heirs-at-law of . . ." the grantor. The grantor died first,
and then A died without heirs of her body. The case then arose
between the surviving heirs of the grantor and the devisee of
the land from A. It was the latter's contention that the interest
limited to the heir of the grantor was void and that the grantor
retained a reversion in the land which on the grantor's death
intestate passed, in part at least, through A-an heir of the
grantor-to the devisee under A's will. The surviving heirs of
the grantor contended that the future interest given the heirs
at law of the grantor was a contingent remainder, and not a
reversion, which vested in the heirs of the grantor living at the
death of the life tenant without bodily issue, and because A was
not alive at this time, she took nothing at this time by this grant,
and consequently the devisee likewise took nothing. The trial
court accepted this latter contention, and it was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Missouri. The court expressly rejected the
24. 264 S.W. 911 (Mo. 1924).
25. 344 Mo. 290, 126 S.W.2d 187 (1939).
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contention of the devisee, saying that the rule he contended for
was based on feudal concepts of no import now, and concluded
that the grant created contingent class remainders in the alter-
native or with a double aspect. It further held that the class
was determined, and that the remainders finally vested on the
death of the life tenant, the court reasoning from its definition
of a contingent remainder as one where the estate is limited
to take effect either on a dubious or uncertain event, or is limited
to a dubious or uncertain person. Here, both classes of remain-
dermen were dubious and uncertain as to both person and event.
In support of this conclusion, the court reasoned that the word
"revert," as used in the conveyance, could not have been used
in its technical sense signifying a reversion, for the reason that
a reversion is not, by definition, created by conveyance, but re-
mains by the force of law after something less than that which
the grantor had is conveyed away, and hence the word revert
must have been used in the sense of "pass" or "go."
It is clear that the Supreme Court of Missouri is not going to
follow the reasoning put forward in any of the aforementioned
three cases, for in the Davidson case, although nothing was said
about the Kuehne case or the Rayl case, the court in commenting
upon the Norman case used the following language:
We think the issue rightly ruled upon which Norman v.
Horton turned and distinguishable on the facts from the
instant issue. Observations there made arguendo and un-
necessary to a determination of the review, dictum, lack
authoritative force as a precedent if necessarily inconsistent
herein. 26
The distinction which the court appears to be referring to is
based upon the time of determining the heirs of the grantor.
Before the doctrine of worthier title is applicable, the word
"heirs" must have reference to those persons who would be the
heirs of the grantor at the time of his death.27 In the Norton
case, the court concluded that the class of heirs was to be deter-
mined upon the death of the life tenant, and thus, even if the
court had there decided to apply the doctrine of worthier title,
the result would have been that the heirs had a remainder, for
that case falls within the exception to the rule.
26. 350 Mo. 639, 645, 167 S.W.2d 641 644 (1943).
27. RESTATEMENT, PRoPERTY §314 (1940); SIMES, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF FuTuRa INTERESTS 86 (Ist ed. 1951). See 16 A.L.R.2d 691 (1951).
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Outside of these three cases, no other cases in Missouri have
been found in which the facts would have warranted an appli-
cation of the doctrine of worthier title to an inter vivos trans-
action and in which the court has not held that the interest in
the grantor or his heirs was a reversion, 28 although in some of
the cases no mention was made of the doctrine in express lan-
guage. For instance, the doctrine was in effect applied in Wells
v. Kuhn,'2 where the conveyance was from A to B for life, and
if B died before A then the land was to revert to A, but if A pre-
deceased B the land was to descend and vest in A's heirs at law.
The court held that A retained a reversion, and as a result when
A subsequently made a further conveyance purporting to convey
the whole title to the land to B, B took a fee simple title. The
court put its decision on the ground that the word "heirs" when
used in a conveyance is presumptively a word of limitation and
not of purchase, and that there was nothing to show that a con-
trary intent was present in this case. In other words, where
there is a limitation in favor of the heirs of the grantor, the
words are not used as words of purchase indicating a particular
class to take under the instrument, but are words of limitation
describing the quality of the preceding estate, in this case the
life estate of B.
As indicated above, the rule is today generally applied to
personalty as well as to realty,30 but there is no case in Missouri
involving the question of whether the rule applies to personal
property alone. However, in Stephens v. Moore3" both real estate
and personal property were involved. There the grantor trans-
ferred real estate of the value of $30,000 and personal property
worth $10,000 to a trustee to be held for the benefit of the
grantor for his life, and on his death the corpus of the property
"... shall pass to and vest in my legal heirs or as may be directed
in my will." The court held that the grantor retained a reversion
in the property, and consequently, there being no one else besides
the grantor beneficially interested in the trust, the grantor could
28. Bullock v. People's Bank of Holcomb, 351 Mo. 587, 173 S.W.2d 753(1943); Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215, 249 S.W. 601 (1923); Wells v.
Kuhn, 221 S.W. 19 (Mo. 1920).
29. 221 S.W. 19 (Mo. 1920).
30. See note 17 supra.
31. 298 Mo. 215, 249 S.W. 601 (1923).
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revoke the trust without the consent of others.32 The court indi-
cated that it conceived of the reason for the rule as that given
by the Restatement by using the following language:
When the deed involved in this proceeding is considered as
a whole it seems very clear that the grantor had no thought
of making a disposition of his estate to take effect at his
death; the sole purpose was to provide for the handling and
managing of his property during his own lifetime; the
words, 'and the trust shall pass to and vest in my legal heirs
or as may be directed in my will', is a mere statement, by
way of further limitation of the trustee's estate, that the
grantor reserves full authority to dispose of the reversion
as he sees fit.
33
Throughout the Missouri cases there is no discussion of the
initial problem of construction to determine the grantor's intent
with regard to the description of the persons who are to take
the interest in the property after the termination of the particu-
32. Where the trust conveyance is by the grantor to the trustee in fee
simple, to hold for the benefit of the grantor for life, and on his death to
convey the property to the grantor's heirs, a situation is presented where
technically either the rule in Shelley's Case or the doctrine of worthier
title is applicable to avoid the purported equitable interest in the grantor's
heirs. This is true for whereas the rule in Shelley's Case applies where
there is a limitation to the heirs of the grantee, and the doctrine of worthier
title is applicable where the limitation is to the heirs of the grantor, here
the grantor and the grantee are the same person. A distinction should be
kept in mind, however. This situation arises only where the limitation in
trust is such as to give the heirs of the grantor-grantee an equitable re-
mainder, and not a legal remainder, for if there is a legal remainder in
the heirs of the grantor, the rule in Shelley's Case would not be applicable
because the grantor-grantee would have only an equitable interest, and the
rule applies only where the grantee and his heirs have interests of the
same quality. In this last factual situation, the only available doctrine to
avoid the purported legal interest in the heirs of the grantor-grantee would
be the doctrine of worthier title. It is submitted that in the situation where
a choice is available as to which rule should be applied the doctrine of
worthier title should be used because the reason given to justify the appli-
cation of the doctrine in modern times is just as convincing here as in any
other situation.
33. 298 Mo. 215, 227, 249 S.W. 601, 604 (1923). It should be pointed
out that a number of courts have seized upon the fact that the grantor
in this situation expressly retained the power to dispose of the corpus of
the trust by will only to find an intent contrary to the application of the
doctrine of worthier title, and thus have found that the heirs of the grantor
received a contingent remainder under the trust conveyance. The reason-
ing is this: If the grantor retained a reversion he would have all the inci-
dents of ownership including full power to dispose of the property either
by will or by deed. By expressly singling out the power to dispose of the
property by will only, he has indicated that he means to relinquish all
other incidents of ownership and consequently that he intends to create a
remainder in his heirs. The leading case adopting this reasoning is Whitte-
more v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929). For a
full discussion of the cases see Morris, supra note 12, at 151.
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lar estate. As already indicated, these persons must be the heirs
or next of kin of the grantor, as these terms are used in their
primary sense; otherwise, the doctrine of worthier title is not
applicable. One possible situation where this problem of con-
struction arises is where the grantor has conveyed a life estate
to A and then limited a "remainder" to a class of people whom
the grantor may have confused with his heirs, such as his chil-
dren or issue. 4 In such a situation, the court is confronted with
the problem of determining whether the grantor actually meant
children or issue, or whether he mistakenly substituted one of
these words for the word "heirs" or "next of kin." However,
in Missouri this problem of possible substitution of one word
such as children for the word "heirs" has not yet arisen, for in
every case where the doctrine of worthier title has been applied
or could have been applied, the limitation contained some lan-
guage indicating that the property was to go to those who would
have taken the property by intestate succession from the grantor,
such as "grantor's heirs" or "grantor's estate." However, the
same problem of construction has arisen in a slightly different
way, for, although there are no cases where the grantor could
have mistakenly substituted another word for the word "heirs,"
in many cases the grantor, besides limiting an interest to those
who would take from him by intestate succession, included him-
self in the limitation. In fact, in only two cases was the limita-
tion in the exact form required for the applicability of the
doctrine of worthier title (X to A for life, and then to the heirs
of X). In one of those cases the doctrine was applied, the de-
cision being that X retained a reversion, whereas the doctrine
was specifically rejected in the other.35 The two possible situa-
tions which arise when the grantor includes himself in the limi-
tation are: first, that in which the grantor designates that the
property is to go, after the termination of the preceding par-
ticular estate, to the grantor and his heirs, and secondly, that in
which it is indicated that the property is to go to the grantor or
34. Of course, unless a strong showing of contrary intent is made, these
words would be given their normal meaning, but if such an intent be
shown, it is possible to construe "children" to mean heirs. See: RESTATE-
MENT, PRoPETY §§305-307 (1940). For a case construing "heirs" to mean
children see George v. Widemire, 242 Ala. 579, 7 So.2d 269 (1942).
35. Norman v. Horton 341 Mo. 290, 126 S.W.2d 187 (1939) (rejected);
Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215, 249 S.W. 601 (1923) (applied).
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his heirs. The second limitation might be spelled out more fully
to the effect that the property is to go to the grantor if he sur-
vives the life tenant, but that the heirs of the grantor are to have
the property if the grantor predeceases the life tenant.
The fact that the grantor used one of these two phrases rather
than the other, and rather than the term "his heirs" alone, in
describing those persons who are, by the terms of the convey-
ance, to take the property may become important at three dif-
ferent levels in the consideration of the applicability of the
doctrine of worthier title. First of all, it must be determined,
in the initial problem of construction, whether the grantor really
intended to include himself in the limitation or rather whether
.he intended merely to limit an interest to his heirs by the use of
one of the two aforementioned phrases. Secondly, if it is deter-
mined that the grantor intended to include himself in the limita-
tion, how is this going to affect the application of the doctrine
of worthier title? And finally, if it is found that the doctrine is
still applicable when the grantor uses one of these two phrases,
how is this going to be taken into account when the consideration
is whether a contrary intent is expressed? When we turn to the
limitation to the "grantor" and his "heirs" at the first level, the
problem is merely one of discovering the intent of the grantor.
Just as it may be found in some cases in which the grantor con-
veyed property in language similar to "grantor to A for life
and then to the grantor's children" that he really meant to say
"grantor to A for life and then to the grantor's heirs," it is also
conceivable, although not likely, that when the grantor conveyed
property in language similar to "grantor to A for life and then
to the grantor and his heirs" the grantor really meant to say
"grantor to A for life and then to the grantor's heirs." How-
ever, although in many situations it is quite possible that the
grantor did confuse the meaning of the word "children" with
that of the word "heirs," it is indeed unlikely that such a con-
,fusion would exist between the phrases "grantor and his heirs"
and "his heirs." Certainly no argument can be made in favor
of construing the former phrase to mean the latter on the basis
of the doctrine of worthier title, for it is utterly unlikely that
the grantor had the problem in mind at the time of the convey-
ance. If he did, certainly he would have spelled out his intention
more fully. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that in some cases
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such a construction can be put on the phrase "grantor and his
heirs."36
Once it is concluded that the grantor did not intend to limit
the interest to his heirs by the use of the phrase "the grantor
and his heirs," it follows that the application of the doctrine of
worthier title is going to be affected. The doctrine is, by the
statement of the rule, limited to the situation in which the
grantor limits an interest to his heirs.37 When the limitation is
to the grantor and his heirs one of the essential elements for the
application of the doctrine is missing. However, where this is
the form of the limitation a result similar to that which would
have been reached had the doctrine been applied is nevertheless
reached, although the basis for the result is different. By defi-
nition a remainder is an interest created in a party other than
the grantor,1' and also by definition a reversion can exist only
in the grantor and arises by operation of law when the grantor
conveys away something less than he has.30 Consequently, when
a grantor limits an interest to himself and his heirs after a life
estate, he is limiting to himself exactly what the law would have
implied had nothing more than the life estate been conveyed
away, and he is trying to create in himself and his heirs some-
thing which, by definition, can be created only in some other
person. The result is that the remainder limited in the convey-
ance is void, the grantor retaining a reversion.4 0 The Missouri
cases are in accord on this point, although from the discussion
in the cases, the ground on which the decisions are reached is
not at all clear. In Hobbs v. Yeager 41 the grantor conveyed to A
and B for life, and on their death ". . . to their children if any
such be living at such time, forever, and if no such children be
living at their death, then to the... [grantor] ... and his heirs
forever." The argument was made that under the deed the
entire title passed out of the grantor, that since there were no
36. If a seventy-five year old grantor conveyed his land to his twenty-
five year old granddaughter for her life in consideration of the latter's
caring for the grantor for the remainder of his days, with a "remainder"
to the grantor and his heirs, it would seem that such a construction would
be possible.
37. SiMES, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW or FUTURE INTERESTS 85 (Ist ed.
1951).
38. 38 AM. JUR. 510.
39. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 15 (3rd ed., Jones, 1939) ; 3a AM. JuL. 510.
40. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 7 (3rd ed., Jones, 1939).
41. 263 S.W. 225 (Mo. 1924).
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children of the life tenant in whom the fee could vest, it went
into abeyance to abide the time when children, in whom the fee
could "vest" as contingent remaindermen, might be born, and
that since the life tenant died without children, the fee reverted
at that time to the grantor's heirs. It was further argued that
contingent class remainders in the alternative were created by
the deed, the respective classes to be determined at the death of
the life tenant along the line of the reasoning in the Norman
case. The court rejected both of these arguments, and found
that the deed created a life estate, and also provided for a "con-
tingent remainder to vest in the children" of A and B. It further
found that the grantor retained a reversion subject to complete
defeasance by the life tenant's death with children. The court
said that this was not the case of a ". . . reversion by operation
of law to the grantor and his heirs upon the expiration of the
estate granted, but, under this deed there was an express reten-
tion, a reservation by the grantor himself, subject to its being
thereafter divested .... -42
In Keller v. Keller 3 the grantor conveyed land to A and his
heirs, but in a subsequent part of the instrument it was recited
that "it is hereby expressly agreed to and understood .. .that
in the case that the said... [A] ... die without children the...
real estate shall revert to... [grantor] ... and his heirs ...."
The court, with practically no discussion of the problem, held
that the conveyance passed a determinable fee simple, with the
grantor retaining a possibility of reverter
Although the decisions in both of these cases are in accord
with the proposition stated above, it appears that the reasoning
is not the same, and it further appears from the argument of
counsel that in their minds, at least, there was some confusion
between these facts and those to which the doctrine of worthier
title is applicable. It is suggested that a consideration of the
definition of remainders and reversions and a decision based on
such definitions would aid in the solution of the problem.
At the third level of importance, the fact that the grantor
limited the interest to himself and his heirs would appear to
have no effect. If, in the first place, it is found that the grantor
actually intended to limit the interest to himself and his heirs,
42. Id. at 227.
43. 338 Mo. 731, 92 S.W.2d 157 (1936).
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the doctrine of worthier title is not applicable, as we have seen.
If, on the other hand, it is found that the grantor meant only
to limit the interest to his heirs, the fact that the grantor men-
tioned himself in the limitation can have no effect toward show-
ing an intent contrary to the application of the doctrine, for, by
the initial determination of intent, the court will have found that
nothing was meant by the insertion of the word "grantor" into
the limitation.
We shall now direct attention to the limitation to "the grantor
or his heirs." As to the initial problem of construction, the
problem is much the same as the problems of construing the
phrase just considered. However, no matter what construction
is placed on the phrase, the court is faced with two possible
decisions, and either of these decisions could result under either
of the possible constructions. If, by the initial process of con-
struction, it is determined that the grantor actually intended
that the limitation include himself, as to the limitation to the
grantor a reversion should be found, based on the same reason-
ing as that just considered, and as to the limitation to the
grantor's heirs, the decision should turn on whether the doctrine
of worthier title is to be applied. The reversion in the grantor
would have to be in fee simple, for all reversions are in fee
simple; but unless the doctrine is applied to the limitation to the
heirs, the reversion would be defeasable on the grantor's dying
before the termination of the particular estate. If the doctrine
is applied, the effect would be to make the reversion indefeasible,
for the limitation to the heirs which made the reversion de-
feasible would be void. If, however, by the initial construction
it is determined that the grantor did not intend to include him-
self in the limitation, and that he only intended to limit the
interest to his heirs, the doctrine of worthier title is applicable
to the whole phrase, and the same two possibilities result. This
is so because, whereas in the first situation where the court finds
the limitation to the grantor to be void, and a reversion is found
to remain in him, the court is doing nothing more than finding
a reversion where one would be found had nothing been said
about the grantor in the limitation, in this situation nothing is
said about the reversion and one will be found by operation of
law. Consequently, in both situations the court is left with the
possibilities of finding this reversion to be indefeasible or de-
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feasible accordingly as it finds the doctrine of worthier title to
be applicable or inapplicable. However, there is a possibility that
the particular construction placed on the phrase in the original
consideration of it may have a bearing on whether a contrary
intent is expressed. This aspect will be considered below.
This form of the limitation has arisen in four Missouri cases.
In Davidson v. Todd 4 the limitation was to "the grantor herein
or become part of his estate." As already indicated, the court
held that the grantor retained a reversion and put its decision
squarely on the doctrine of worthier title, without discussing the
interpretation to be put on this phrase. From the fact that the
decision was placed squarely on this ground, nothing can be in-
ferred as to what the court thought of this phrase; under either
the interpretation that it merely meant to the grantor's heirs,
or that it meant to the grantor or his heirs, the doctrine is
properly applicable. However, because the court subsequently
found an intent that the doctrine should be applied from the fact
that the grantor mentioned himself in the limitation, it is in-
ferable that the court put the latter interpretation on the phrase.
In Rayl v. Golfinoputos45 the limitation was to the grantor if he
outlived the life tenant, or to the grantor's heirs if he predeceased
the life tenant. The court again did not consider the interpre-
tation to be put on the phrase, perhaps because the latter con-
tingency actually came to pass, and found that a remainder was
created in the heirs of the grantor by the conveyance. In Wells v.
Kun 48 the limitation was in the same form, and again no con-
sideration was given to this question. However, in this case the
court found that the grantor retained a reversion. In Bullock V.
People's Bank of Holcomb47 the conveyance was from X to A
"... for her natural life and the remainder in fee to the bodily
heirs.. ." of A, and if A die without bodily heirs the land was
to "revert" back to the grantor if he was still living, but if he
was dead it was to go to the grantor's estate. Under the afore-
mentioned Missouri statute, it was held that A had a life estate
and that there was a contingent remainder in A's bodily heirs.
The court also held, without any discussion of the doctrine of
worthier title or any consideration of the problem here in ques-
44. 350 Mo. 639, 167 S.W.2d 641 (1943).
45. 264 S.W. 911 (Mo. 1942).
46. 221 S.W. 19 (Mo. 1920).
47. 357 Mo. 587, 173 S.W.2d 753 (1943).
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tion, that the grantor retained a reversion subject to complete
defeasance.
It is at the third level that it is possible that a difference in
the initial interpretation may make an important difference. If,
in the first place, the initial interpretation is that the grantor
merely intends to limit an interest to his heirs, it is difficult to
find any indication of intent from the fact that he included him-
self in the limitation, for it has already been determined that he
meant nothing by such inclusion. If, on the other hand, it is
determined that he meant to include himself in the limitation,
the argument presents itself that by so doing the grantor was
thinking of himself as again coming into possession of the land.
That inference in turn shows that he really did not intend to
give up the interest which he had in the land except during the
period of the particular estate, and consequently shows an intent
to keep a reversion.48 However, an argument to the contrary can
also be made. The grantor, if he has an indefeasible reversion
in fee simple, has all the incidents of ownership including the
right to go into possession on the termination of the particular
estate. By spelling out that the property is to go to himself or
his heirs, depending on who is living at the termination of the
particular estate, he is accurately describing who would have
gone into possession of the land on the termination of that
estate had there been no limitation of the ownership of the land
after the particular estate. Since this would have occurred any-
way, it seems more consistent to say that by spelling this out he
meant something other than that which would have happened
anyway, and consequently an intention is manifested that he
thought of himself as having a defeasible reversion and the
heirs a contingent remainder. Of two weak arguments the
former seems the better, for if the latter were accepted it would
48. In Davidson v. Todd, 350 Mo. 639, 644, 167 S.W.2d 641, 644 (1943),
the court said with reference to this point:
. . . grantor conveyed to himself as grantee that estate which he al-
ready held---conveyed as a remainder what he had as a reversion. If
an inter vivos gift in remainder to grantor's own heirs be a nullity
for the reasons indicated, a fortiori the average grantor would not
intend to create an indestructible interest in himself or in his estate
in a grant inter vivos. The quoted words [The said premises to revert
to the grantor herein or become part of his estate] usually may be
considered to express an intention to hold the reversion and not to
put the fee in abeyance ...
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be an argument in favor of finding a contrary intent where the
grantor limited an interest simply to his heirs.
The rule as applied to devises or bequests has been stated as
follows:
A devise to an heir which gives to him no greater estate
than he would have had if the words of devise had been
omitted, and which gives to him no different estate in
quality, connection with other tenants, and the like, is with-
out any legal effect; and the heir takes by descent and not
by devise.49
The reasons for this rule are substantially the same as those
given for the rule as applied to inter vivos transactions, 0 and,
as the inter vivos doctrine has been criticized, so has the applica-
tion of the rule in the case of wills.- The Restatement of Prop-
erty has taken the position that the doctrine has no application to
wills,5 2 and it would seem that since no reason for the rule re-
mains except that given by the Restatement, and that that reason
depends on the grantor's continued life, which obviously cannot
occur in the case of a devise, the Restatement position is sound.
This view is supported by the cases in Missouri, for in no case
that has been found where there was an interest limited to the
heirs or next of kin of the testator has the interest of the heirs
been considered anything other than a remainder. Here again,
most of the cases decided do not even consider the doctrine or
worthier title.
In the latest case" there was a devise by the testator to his
daughter for life and on her death remainder to the daughter's
children, the lineal descendants of any deceased child taking his
parent's share, and if the daughter die without lineal descendants,
".. . then the lands ... shall revert to my-heirs-at-law." The
court held that the conveyance created a life estate in the daugh-
ter and "an alternative or substitutional estate in the remainder,"
i. e., a remainder in the children of the daughter or their descend-
ants, and in default thereof in the heirs of the testator, and that
the determination of the members of the respective classes was
to be made at the death of the life tenant. The court relied in
49. 1 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 435.
50. Ibid.; Harper and Heckel, supra note 6, at 627.
51. See note 50 supra.
52. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §314(2) (1940); SIIES, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF FuTum INTERESTS 84 (1st ed. 1951).
53. Brittin v. Karrenbrock, 186 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. App. 1945).
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part on the Norman case in order to construe the word "revert"
to mean "pass" or "go," and was perfectly cognizant of the de-
cision in the Davidson case, for it cited the case. The court
apparently distinguished the latter case on two grounds: (1) on
the ground that in this case a will was involved, whereas in the
Davidson case the transfer was intervivos; that in construing
the instruments it is the intention of the testator or grantor, as
the case may be, which is to govern; that the reason for holding
that a "remainder" to the heirs of the grantor is not a remainder,
but a reversion, is the presumed intent of the grantor that he
retain the power to destroy the interest of the heirs, during his
(the grantor's) life, whereas in the case of a will ". . . he had
no thought of a reversion in the sense of an estate left in him-
self, as might be the case in a grant made by deed, because he
was speaking by will" ;54 (2) on the ground that the identifica-
tion of the heirs was to be made at the death of the life tenant
and not at the death of the testator.
The other cases involving testamentary dispositions are sub-
stantially in accord with this case.5 5 The cases are too numerous
to be discussed individually, and nothing would be gained thereby.
It is clear that no distinction is made between a gift of real or
personal property, and for the most part no consideration is
given to the doctrine here in question. In connection with this
last statement, it should be pointed out that in practically every
case the devise or bequest was either "X to A for life and on A's
death then to the heirs of X," or "X to A for life and on A's
death to A's bodily issue, but if A die without bodily issue, then
to the heirs of X." The major issue which the Missouri Supreme
Court decided in each case was at what time the determination
of the class of heirs or bodily issue should be made-at the death
of the testator or of the life tenant. Its decisions have gone both
ways, depending on the facts of each of individual case. The
court, in making the determination, assumes the interest in the
heirs of the testator to be a remainder, usually without discus-
sion.
54. Id. at 37.
55. Harwell v. Magill, 348 Mo. 365, 153 S.W.2d 362 (1941); Fullerton
v. Fullerton, 132 S.W.2d 966 (Mo. 1939); Irvine v. Ross, 339 Mo. 692, 98
S.W.2d 763 (1936); Gardner v. Vanlandingham, 334 Mo. 1054, 69 S.W.2d
947 (1934); Evans v. Rankin, 329 Mo. 411, 44 S.W.2d 644 (1931); Baker
v. Kennedy 238 S.W. 790 (Mo. 1922) ; Tevis v. Tevis, 259 Mo. 19, 167 S.W.
1003 (1914).
Washington University Open Scholarship
136 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
In conclusion, it is apparent that the courts of Missouri are
going to follow the doctrine and reasoning set forth in the Re-
statement of Property, for in every case decided since the publi-
cation of that work, the decision of the court has been in accord
with the rule stated therein.56 And the rule expounded by the
Restatement is a sound one in view of the reason given in support
of it-i.e., that it is probably the intention of the grantor to
retain control over the reversion, but such cannot be the inten-
tion of the testator. But the rule as there stated is only a rule of
construction and is to be applied only when a contrary intent is
not shown. Although none of the Missouri cases have discussed
what would be a contrary intent, numerous cases in other juris-
dictions have considered the point, and perhaps a brief summary
of what has been held to be a manifestation of a contrary intent
in those cases is justified here.
One of the most important factors which has been seized upon
as showing a contrary intent is the provision in a trust instru-
ment that the settlor retains power to dispose of the corpus of the
trust only. Thus were the settlor conveys property in trust for
A for life and on A's death the corpus is to go to the heirs of the
settlors unless the settlor has otherwise disposed of the property
by will, the courts have generally found that a contingent remain-
der is created by the instrument in the settlor's heirs on the
ground that a contrary intent is shown by the inclusion of that
phrase. The reasoning is as follows. If the settlor had a reversion
he would have all the rights and powers incident to the ownership
of the reversion, including the right to dispose of the property
by will or deed. By singling out the power to dispose of the prop-
erty by will only, the settlor has indicated that that is the only
way he can dispose of the interest, and this is inconsistent with
the idea that he retains a reversion. 7 But as already pointed out
the Missouri case of Stephens v. Moore58 is inconsistent with
this reasoning.
Some courts have seized upon the fact that the grantor has
said that the land shall "revert" to the heirs or next of kin of
56. Bullock v. Peoples Bank of Holcomb, 351 Mo. 587, 173 S.W.2d 753(1943); Davidson v. Todd, 350 Mo. 639, 167 S.W.2d 641 (1943); Harwell
v. Magill, 348 Mo. 365, 153 S.W.2d 362 (1941) ; Brittin v. Karrenbrock, 196
S.W.2d 35 (Mo. App. 1945).
57. Morris, supra note 12, at 151.
58. 298 Mo. 215, 249 S.W. 601 (1923).
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the grantor and found from this an intention that a remainder
was not to be created. This reasoning is placed on the ground
that the grantor is merely spelling out what would have happened
to the property had nothing more than the particular estate been
conveyed away, and that by the use of the word "revert" the
grantor is showing that that is all he was doing.59 However, the
Missouri courts seem to attach little importance to the fact that
the word was used or not used. 0
Where the property is conveyed in trust with a "remainder"
to the settlor's heirs or next of kin, and the settlor retains a good
deal of power of control over the trust property, there is also an
indication of intent that the heirs or next of kin do not have re-
mainders. This result is on the ground that such broad power
over the trust property seems to negate any idea that the crea-
tion of any interest in the heirs or next to kin of the settlor was
intended. In Gordon v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co.,0 ' the settlor
transferred personal property in trust. The income of the prop-
erty was to be paid to him until he reached the age of forty, and
after he reached that age $2,000 per year of the principal was
to be paid to him in addition to the income until all of the prop-
erty and income were paid to him, but if he died before this
occurred the property was to go to his heirs unless his will in-
dicated otherwise. The settlor was co-trustee, and he had the
power to remove the other trustee. The court held that no re-
mainder was created, seizing on the fact that the grantor had
such broad powers of control to find such an intent.
Where the grantor spells out what law of descent and distribu-
tion is to govern who will be his heirs or next of kin, some courts
have found an intention that the grantor intended to create a
remainder, even though the statute mentioned was the one which
would have governed anyway. Apparently the reasoning is that
since the statute mentioned was the same one which would have
59. Morris, supra note 12, at 155.
60. In Norman v. Horton, 344 Mo. 290, 126 S.W.2d 187 (1939), the court
found that the heirs of the grantor got a remainder under a provision that
the property should revert to the heirs of the grantor, construing "revert"
to mean to "pass" or "go". And in Davidson v. Todd, 350 Mo. 639, 167
S.W.2d 641 (1943), the court found the grantor retained a reversion under
a similar limitation, but placed absolutely no reliance on the fact that the
limitation contained the word "revert."
61. 272 App. Div. 565, 73 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1st Dept. 1947); Morris, supra
note 12, at 154.
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governed had none been mentioned, the grantor must have meant
something else by such mention of the statute, and this intention
is that the heirs or next of kin get a remainder. This seems weak.
The words spelling out the particular statute which should gov-
ern should be treated as what the grantor probably intended
them to be, i.e., a mere statement of what the law is, from which
no intention concerning the problem here in question can be
drawn. Most of the cases are in accord with this treatment.
However, where the statute mentioned is that of a state other
than the one in which the grantor is living, an intention that the
persons who would take under that statute should take as re-
maindermen can fairly be found.2
It has been said that where the people who will fit the descrip-
tion of the grantor's heirs or next of kin are to be determined
at a time other than the grantor's death, there is an intention
shown that the heirs or next of kin are to take as remainder-
men. 3 However, the better statement seems to be that the doc-
trine of worthier title simply does not apply to a situation like
this, and consequently there is no opportunity for finding any
contrary intent at all. This is because the doctrine presupposes
that the heirs or next of kin have a possibility of taking the
property by either of two methods at the grantor's death-by
descent or by purchase-and the rule is applied to determine
how they are going to take. If, by the terms of the conveyance,
it is found that the heirs or next of kin are not to be determined
at the grantor's death, then they cannot take by descent, and,
consequently, there is no opportunity to apply the doctrine to
determine by which method they are to take. Under such cir-
cumstances, the heirs or next of kin must take as purchasers.
The above is merely a brief summary of some factors which
have been seized upon in other jurisdictions to find the grantor's
intent. There are possibly many other factors which could be
used; in general the contrary intent to be found is that which
shows that the grantor did not intend to have complete control
over the interest left after the particular estate, and there is no
natural limit on the number of factors which can be used to
show such an intent. C. HAvARD PERKiNs
62. Id. at 157.
63. Id. at 156.
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